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RHETORIC AS RITUAL:
THE SEMIOTICS OF THE ATTIC FUNERAL ORATION
K .R .  Walters
The Athenians were unique among the ancient Greeks in the burial of 
their war dead.1 These they interred not, like the other Greeks, on the 
battlefield where they fell, but in a common grave in their public 
cemetery. It was located in the Kerameikos, Athens' most beautiful 
suburb. This practice had begun at least by the time of the Persian 
Wars and lasted throughout the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Its 
most outstanding feature was the funeral oration recited annually each 
winter over those who had died in the previous summer's campaigns.^
This epitaphios logos comprises a genre of literature that provides us 
with unusual access to the concerns and issues of Athenian society.
Our direct evidence spans the years 465 to 322 B.C.3 It thus coincides 
with the career of Athenian democracy, with the rise and fall of the 
Athenian empire, and with the brilliant efflorescence at Athens of 
oratory, philosophy, history, and tragedy. While the funeral oration's 
ostensible purpose was to eulogize the dead, in fact it was an encomium 
on the city itself. The epitaphioi reveal how the Athenians pictured 
to themselves their city's merits and achievements, its present policy 
and past actions.
Indeed, these speeches formed a truly popular genre. The speakers 
were selected by the democratic city council, themselves chosen for 
office by blind lot, and voted upon by the assembly. Their qualifications
were not oratorical or intellectual brilliance, but political respecta­
bility.^ Further, . the contents of the speeches were remarkably static: 
traditional themes and exempla were recited with little or no change 
year after year, in speech after speech. Although some originality and 
variation were permitted, the speakers were constrained to work within 
very close limits. Indeed, the constant repetition of commonplace 
themes gives the orations a formulaic, almost liturgical quality. Yet, 
though less lofty in artistic expression or undistinguished for individual 
brilliance, these speeches fulfilled an important, indeed vital, social 
function for the Athenians.^ However hackneyed its themes may seem, the 
funeral oration was a true vox populi: it promulgated a message that 
was hardly the personal expression of the orators, but rather the collect­
ive voice of the Athenian polity. In sum, the orations were designed not 
to inform or to innovate, but to articulate in ritual fashion shared 
community ideals, values, and attitudes. In particular, they expressed 
and sought to resolve troubling inconsistencies and contradictions that 
were the legacy of Athenian culture and history.
The issues which the epitaphios embraced were many. Here the focus 
will be to examine the treatment of just one set of contradictions, the 
conflict between a cultural ideal of Panhellenic altruism and harmony and 
one of ruthless lust for honour (φιλοτιμία) and supremacy at any cost 
(φιλονικία).6 This latter code spawned an actual practice of interstate 
rivalry and selfish aggrandizement, in which Athenian aggression and 
militarism played a prominent role, a practice which clashed with the 
Panhellenic ideal. At the same time, this aggressive foreign policy 
generated fear and resistance among the other Greek states that resulted 
in the Peloponnesian War and Athens' total and humiliating defeat. This 
historical experience was a negation of the code of φιλοτιμία and 
φιλονικία. To account for these inconsistencies the funeral orations 
effected a symbolic resolution by portraying Athens as a lonely benefactor, 
compelled to intervene, sacrificing her citizens' lives to insure justice, 
freedom, and security for the rest of Greece. To demonstrate this function 
it will be necessary first to contextualize the speeches historically and 
culturally and then to show how myth and history were deliberately altered 
and manipulated to serve as paradigms of an ideology that transformed
Athenian aggression into benefaction and failure into success.
The surface discourse of the epitaphioi was universally fulsome, 
indeed hyperbolic, self-praise. The speeches incessantly touted Athens' 
uniqueness, primacy, and selflessness. She alone upheld Hellenic law 
and custom, protecting the weak and oppressed, repelling invasion and 
aggression, punishing wrongdoing. Athens was the only city whose very 
existence was predicated on justice, for her citizens alone were truly 
autochthonous and, unlike others, did not unfairly expel original 
inhabitants to found their polity. Athens was the foremost city, the 
educator of Greece, the guardian of security, the apostle of justice, 
the bestower of freedom. To illustrate these feigned virtues an almost 
unvarying selection of Attic legends and Athenian military successes was 
cited. This representation is a clear expression of the contemporary 
cultural code of altruistic Panhellenism with Athens as its very avatar. 
But there are significant incongruities in these speeches which warn us 
not to accept the surface discourses as a straightforward, if naively 
boastful, representation of the facts. Rather, they indicate that we 
are here dealing with a specialized language of ideology.
A useful entry point into the dynamics of this rhetoric is to 
examine the frequent claims in the epitaphioi to Athenian primacy and 
uniqueness. Although given various expression, the refrain is repeated 
tirelessly. Athens is first in a variety of accomplishments or virtues. 
Athens differs from and thus excels all other Greek cities: Athens 
stands alone and is unique. One common claim, which appears in Herodotus, 
Thucydides, Lysias, Plato, and Demosthenes inter alios, is that Athens 
all by herself repulsed Darius' invasion at Marathon.^ Further, Lysias 
tells us (2.18) that the early Athenians were the first and only ones 
(πρώτοι, xaù μόνοι) to do away with oligarchy and to establish democracy. 
Plato points out (Menex.. 237E) how Athens had been the first and only 
country (πρώτη καί μόνη) to produce human nourishment, a claim repeated 
by Demosthenes (60.5) . Pericles asserts that the Athenians are at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the majority in doing good deeds 
(Thuc. 2.40.4: ένηντιώμεθα τοις πολλοίς), and he claims, "We are the 
only ones who do someone a favour without first calculating what we'll 
get out of it" (Thuc. 2.40.5: μόνοι ώφελουμεν). In sum, he says,
"Athens alone (μόνη) is greater than her reputation . . . and alone (μόνη) 
gives the invader no shame for defeat" (Thuc. 2.41.3). These are only a 
few of the many instances we could catalogue from the extant epitaphic 
literature.®
What is particularly striking is how this formulation was extrapolated 
onto historical events. Uniformly, the funeral orations which chronicled 
Athens' past to illustrate the prowess and αρετή of her forebears distorted 
and misinterpreted these events wilfully and deliberately. In general 
terms, Athenian foreign policy in the fifth century can be characterized 
as one of aggression, military adventurism, and imperialistic expansion 
that went on without halt from the formation of the Delian league in 478 
until the defeat at Aegispotami in 405 B.C. Conversion of Athens' onetime 
league of allies against Persia into a subservient empire, the reduction 
of Aegina, intervention in Egypt, seizure of the Megarid, invasion of 
Boeotia, the ruthless military subjection of allies such as Thasos, Naxos, 
Samos, and Mytilene, the brutal destruction of Melos, and the infatuated 
but ill-fated attempt to seize all Sicily are but highlights in this 
seventy-year career of aggression.9 But in his epitaphios Lysias depicted 
such events in the most glowing terms :
What words or how much time or how great an orator could 
adequately tell the valour of the men who lie buried here? 
Enduring countless hardships and labours, fighting in the 
most brilliant battles, and running the most glorious risks, 
they made Greece free and made their own country supreme 
(μεγίστην). For seventy years they ruled the sea and saved 
their allies from revolution . . . not by weakening them, 
but by making them strong. So great was our forebears' 
military power, the king of Persia no longer coveted foreign 
lands . . . and in that age no tyrant ruled among the Greeks, 
and no city of Hellas was enslaved by the barbarians. Great 
indeed was the restraint and awe our forebears1 courage and 
valour inspired in all men everywhere. That is why they and 
they alone (μόνους) deserved to be foremost (προστάτας) of the 
Greeks and leaders (ηγεμόνες) of their cities. (2.54-57, abridged)
There are many examples which show how the epitaphioi specifically inverted 
or falsified well-known events to fit this same paradigm. In these the 
Athenians not only distorted the truth to insist on how they accomplished 
great deeds, but also they omitted altogether their allies' help or parti­
cipation. The result is, of course, that the Athenians appear not just to 
have led the way but to have acted single-handedly. For example, they 
claimed total credit for the victory at Artemisium (480 B.C.). Lysias says 
(2.30-32), "The Athenians embarked in their ships and won the victory 
there," while by contrast, he notes, the Spartans were being crushed at 
Thermopylae. What Lysias failed to mention, of course, is that the fleet 
of 324 ships at Artemisium, while preponderantly of Athenian vessels, 
represented forces from Corinth, Megara, Chalcidice, Aegina, Sicyon,
Sparta, Epidaurus, Eretria, Troezen, Styra, Ceos, and the Opuntian 
Locrians. Lysias also neglected to mention that the commander of the 
Greek fleet was not an Athenian, but Eurybiades, the Spartan (Hdt. 8.1-2).
These examples point up two important mechanisms in the speeches.
First, the assertions and illustrations of Athenian uniqueness, super­
iority, altruism, and of acting alone for the common good constituted a 
device to transform Athenian aggression into noble self-sacrifice. In 
this way, it offered a mediation between the code of Panhellenic altruism 
and the reality of interstate warfare governed by φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία. 
Hence, the facts of history as the Athenians indeed knew them were com­
promised and distorted to serve as paradigms of this resolution. The 
funeral orations are so rife with such falsifications that it would be 
impossible to list them all exhaustively here.10 But a few typical 
examples will help establish their tendency. For instance, in Lysias 
(2.20-46) the Athenians are given almost complete credit for winning the 
Persian Wars, but no mention is made of the Hellenic League, although the 
Serpent Column lists thirty-one allies, nineteen of whom are Peloponnesians 
or their allies.H Similarly, Themistocles is credited with leadership 
at Salamis (2.42), whereas in fact Eurybiades the Spartan was supreme 
allied commander. The Athenians are said to have won the "prize of 
valour" (αριστεία) at Salamis, while Herodotus states that the Aeginetans 
were accorded the highest praise for their efforts there (8.93). Hyperides' 
funeral oration also exhibits a number of significant inaccuracies.^
It is claimed that Leosthenes occupied Thermopylae after the battle of 
Boeotia, when in fact he already had control of the area. Harmodius and 
Aristogiton are said to have liberated Athens (6.39), when in fact the 
Alcmaeonids achieved that feat four years later in 510, and with Spartan 
aid, as the Athenians well k n e w . it is further claimed that Leosthenes 
defeated the Macedonians with inferior forces, but in actuality until 
Leonnatus and Craterus arrived, the Greeks had numerical superiority, 
since Antipater's forces were distracted to defend various parts of 
Greece. Finally, no mention is made of Athenian defeats on sea at Abydus, 
Amorgos, and the Lichiades islands.-*-̂  In addition to these examples, 
other instances of distortion and outright falsifications will be pointed 
out in the course of this paper.
In effect, the Athenians in their funeral orations created a perfect 
world, where their cultural values were not in conflict, but complementary. 
But there was a snake in this Eden. For the speeches also reflected a 
deep anxiety over their isolation from the rest of Greece and a resentment 
and suspicion of the other Greeks, who were commonly depicted in the 
epitaphioi as petty, shortsighted, jealous, treacherous, and ungrateful 
for all the benefactions the Athenians had allegedly bestowed on them.
For example, demonstrating at length that Athens' forebears "never did 
an injustice to any Greek or barbarian" (60.7) and that "wherever justice 
was stationed [on the battlefront], there [the Athenians] arrayed them­
selves" (60.18), Demosthenes compared his countrymen with the other Greeks 
thus :
In both [good sense and courage] the Athenians excelled (ττολυ 
διήν&γκαν). If ever a common threat faced all the Greeks they 
were the first (πρώτοo) to foresee it and time and again 
summoned everyone to common salvation. This is a demonstration 
of good intent! And even though ignorance among the rest of 
the Greeks was mixed with spitefulness -- when it was within 
their power to prevent these things without difficulty, either 
they lacked the foresight or else sneered at the danger —  
none the less our forefathers did not bear any grudges: they 
heard the call and were willing to do whatever was right. They
took the lead (προστάντες) and gave their all eagerly, their 
lives, their resources, their allies . . . .
A second example is particularly apposite and requires examination.
Plato's Menexenus was written to satirize the patriotic oratory Plato 
felt so repugnant and pernicious to good government. -*-5 In order to 
expose the weaknesses and insecurities he perceived in the Athenian 
national character, he exaggerated the typical themes of the epitaphios.
Here Socrates purports to recite from memory a funeral oration glued 
together from the scraps left over from Pericles' famous epitaphios.
Written in 386, the dialogue introduced a new, but thematically familiar, 
complaint.-*-® In 392 the Persian satrap Tiribazus had offered peace terms 
to the Spartans. All the other Greeks, says Socrates, including the 
Corinthians, the Argives, and the Boeotians, sold out and were willing to 
get peace by surrendering the Greek cities in Asia Minor. But not so 
with the Athenians. "We alone had the courage neither to give in nor 
to swear to the treaty" (μόνοι δε ημείς ούκ έτολμήσαμεν ο6τε έκδοϋναι 
οοτε ιίμόσαι, 245C) . But the actual facts of the matter were quite diff­
erent. We know that when the treaty was first proposed in 392, it was 
rejected not only by the Athenians, but also by the Thebans and the 
Argives.Eventually Athens did yield, in 386, and swore to the Peace 
of Antalcidas. Only then did the Argives accede, but the Thebans were 
still holding out.18 as a critic of Athenian patriotic oratory, Plato 
had two purposes in presenting this material in his mock epitaphios.
First, the Athenian boast to have stood alone against Persian pressure 
in refusing to swear to the treaty was flatly, almost absurdly, false.
The Menexenus had been written in 386, the very year the Athenians in 
fact caved in and accepted the peace. More importantly, Plato perceived 
the hidden meaning of the μόνος boast, that it also signified abandonment, 
failure, loss of esteem. Accordingly, right after the proud assertion,
"We were the only ones who had the courage not to give in . . . ," he 
had Socrates add, "We were left alone" —  isolated (έμονώθημεν) —
"because we refused to do anything wrong and surrender Greeks to barbarians" 
(245D). Thus, by a linguistic transformation from μόνοι . . . έτολμήσαμεν 
to έμονώθημεν, Plato underscored what he saw as an essential connection
in the psychology of self-praise in the epitaphios logos.
Now, this anxiety over being isolated and alienated from the rest 
of Greece, though magnified by Athens' aggressive posture in expanding 
her empire, had some justification in fact. For it is true that during 
the Persian Wars the other Greeks who had not defected to the Mede were 
unenthusiastic about helping the Athenians face the advancing barbarians. 
When Darius invaded at Marathon in 490 B.C., only the Plataeans came to 
fight alongside the Athenians. The Spartans had been informed in advance, 
but they said that they could not come because they were waiting for the 
full moon. They showed up the day after the battle. In 480 B.C., when 
Xerxes' army invaded Attica and sacked Athens, the Peloponnesians wanted 
to withdraw to the isthmus of Corinth and build a wall to protect the 
Peloponnese, abandoning Athens. Only by a desperate ruse did Themistocles 
compel the Greeks to fight at Salamis and win a great victory. Even the 
next year, when Xerxes had gone home and left a much reduced force in 
Boeotia, the Athenians got the Spartans to help them drive the barbarians 
out of Greece only by a bitter embassy (Hdt. 9.7). In effect, their 
resentment toward the other Greeks for their abandonment at Marathon and 
before and after Salamis made the Athenians transform their isolation 
into a virtue.19 Their successes on land and sea against the Persians 
turned their anger over their adversity into a proud boast,"We fought 
alone." It was a claim that grew so in exaggeration that Athenian 
μονομαχία began to eclipse the facts: allies and their assistance, large 
or small, dropped out of sight, wholly replaced by the Athenians alone. 
Finally, for the seventy years of Athenian empire after the Persian Wars, 
the μόνος theme grew to be a justification of foreign policy. Thus, in 
her own eyes Athens was compelled to become the leader of Greece and to 
act alone because the other states, jealous, quarrelsome, shortsighted, 
spiteful, petty, and vindictive, refused to act for their own good and 
for the good of Hellas.
In sum, this complex of themes, statements, and their historical 
and mythical illustrations comprised a symbolic language which was itself 
a mediation between conflicting cultural codes and of contradictions 
between those codes and Athenian historical experience. We have already 
noted the inconsistency between the codes of altruism and φιλονικία,
of helping others and of helping oneself. While in practice the ideal 
of altruism remained just that, a social myth, φιλονικία engendered an 
actual history of Athenian aggression and imperialist expansion that was 
contrary to helping others, that is, a policy that entailed injuring 
others. At the same time, this aggression created a backlash and invited 
retaliation. It was first instanced by the Persian invasions and then 
culminated in Hellenic resistance to the Athenian empire that resulted 
in the Peloponnesian War and Athens' total defeat. Thus, in simple terms, 
the policy that embodied φιλονικία ended in a historical reality that was 
its complete opposite: instead of being first and most glorious as 
winners, they suffered defeat, hatred, and ignominy. The Athenians' 
problem, which the funeral orations solved -- in so far as any such 
unsolvable problem can be solved --, was to reconcile these conflicts. 
Hence, the epitaphioi generated a perfect, mediated world, in which 
aggression was benefaction and losing was really winning. To effect 
this mediation, the epitaphioi employed a single set of loaded terms, 
"first," "alone," "leaders," "benefactors," "saviours," "liberators," 
which allowed a linguistic, that is, symbolic, resolution of such 
conceptual contradictions. It was a practice which linguists call 
"semantic mismatching," where one set of signifiers can contain contra­
dictory meanings .
A final example in this section will help show how such paradoxes 
were realized. In the Peloponnesian War, according to the Menexenus, 
all the rest of the Greeks were arrayed against Athens. The vast empire 
the city ruled was not mentioned at all! But thus isolated, said 
Socrates, the city refuted the claims of others to have excelled her in 
the Persian Wars: on her own (ίδίςΟ she conquered the leading Greek 
states with whom she had once in alliance defeated the barbarians (242C-D). 
And finally, when Athens was winning the war, something terrible and 
unforeseen happened. "The other Greeks craved so much to be first and 
foremost (είς τοσοϋτον φιλονικίας ελθεΐν) they called in their deadliest 
foe, the king of Persia, whom they had once expelled in joint effort, 
now to attack Athens alone ( i.5¢.q.) and they united all the other Greeks 
and barbarians against her" (243B-C). Yet, said the orator, Athens 
actually won the Peloponnesian War! Or, on second thought, others did
not defeat her, she defeated herself —  by being too kind and generous 
(243D; 244E).
Just as historical accounts were altered in the epitaphioi to serve 
an ideological function, so myths were changed in significant ways for 
the same purpose. Clearly, these reworked legends functioned analogically 
as paradigms to forecast subsequent Athenian historical deeds. Indeed, 
we can see how particularly epitaphic accounts of such legends stemmed 
from and were related to specific historical events and then expanded 
to serve as types for any similarly interpreted events. A close look at 
particular cases will bear this thesis out.
Four major myths were used as paradigms in the Attic funeral ora­
tion. 20 in each specific themes were repeated that illustrated the 
typically claimed Athenian virtues and that proleptically anticipated 
similar acts and attitudes in Athenian history. The basic structure is 
as follows. Either a foreign force has invaded Greece or a Greek state 
has committed an injustice in violation of the Hellenic cultural code 
(νόμος 'Ελληνικός). Athens intervenes, either driving out the foreign 
invaders or else crushing the offending Greek state militarily, thereby 
succouring the oppressed, upholding justice and Hellenic νόμος, and 
punishing the wicked. In each case she must act alone, because other 
Greek states are either afraid to help or spiteful. Of particular 
importance is that the versions of the legends in the epitaphioi that 
illustrate these themes differed significantly from those current else­
where in Greece, indeed in Attica as well. Furthermore, the Athenian 
audience was well aware of these differences. In three of these myths 
the major variation is that in the funeral orations the Athenians were 
portrayed as compelled to intervene militarily, while in other accounts 
the altercations were settled peaceably.
A prominent instance is the legend of how the Athenians secured the 
proper burial of the Seven against T h e b e s .21 According to Lysias’ 
epitaphios, which gave the most expansive account, Athenian redress 
occurred as follows :
First they sent heralds and requested permission to take up
the corpses. When they failed to obtain them, they marched
against [the Thebans]: no previous quarrel subsisted between 
them and the Cadmeans, nor did they wish to gratify the Argives 
who were still living; but thinking it right that those who 
had died in war should receive the customary treatment, they 
risked combat that one side should cease from grossly outraging 
the gods by their trespass against the dead, and that the other 
should not hasten away . . . frustrated of an ancestral honour, 
cut off from Hellenic custom, and disappointed in a common 
hope . . . .  They found a numerous enemy, but had justice as 
their ally, and they fought and conquered . . . .  And in 
contrast to [the Cadmeans'] impiety they showed them their 
own virtue, and obtaining for themselves the prize for which 
they had come -- the corpses of the Argives —  they buried 
them in their own land of Eleusis . . . .  (Lys. 2.7-10, 
abridged)
Yet this peculiarly epitaphic version differed from two other main tradi­
tions. Pausanias noted briefly the epitaphic account of the myth and 
added, "But the Thebans say they returned the corpses voluntarily and 
deny they fought a battle" (1.39.2). This Theban account went back at 
least to the time of Pindar, who mentioned it in two odes, Nemean 9 
(22-4), 474 B.C., and Olympian 6 (12 ff.), 468 B.C. Homer knew of a 
myth wherein the Seven were buried after the battle on Theban soil (XI. 
14.114). J Thus, the version of the funeral oration is idiosyncratic.
But in Athens as well it had a counterpart in which the Athenians suc­
coured the suppliant Argive women by recovering the corpses under a 
treaty. In fact, some traditions reported that Theseus invented treaties 
with this first c o v e n a n t . o u r  most important text is Plutarch, Thes.
29.4-5:
Theseus aided Adrastus in recovering for burial the bodies of 
those who had fallen beneath the walls of the Cadmea, not by 
mastering the Thebans in battle, as Euripides has it in his 
tragedy, but by persuading them to a truce; for so most of 
the writers say, and Philochorus adds that this was the first 
truce ever made for recovering the bodies of those slain in
battle, although in the accounts of Heracles it is written that
he was the first to give the slain back to his enemies . . . .
The account of Euripides is also disproved by that of Aeschylus
in his Eleusinians, where Theseus is made to relate the matter 
25as above.
While these accounts too give the Athenians an important role (it is 
worth noting the typical claim that Theseus was the first to return war 
dead under treaty), their difference in depicting how the conflict between 
Athens and Thebes was settled is of great consequence. Obviously, it 
was not sufficient for the purpose of the funeral orations for the Athen­
ians merely to right the wrong, to assert the νόμος 'Ελληνικός, to 
validate the Panhellenic ideal by peacefully securing the burial of the 
Seven. In epitaphic version, military action and severe punishment of 
Thebes was mandatory. That was because it was a prime function of the 
epitaphioi to validate Athenian aggression as a benefaction. Simple 
satisfaction of the cultural code by retrieving the bodies peaceably 
would in these speeches not have served to mediate the contradiction 
that troubled the Athenians.
Furthermore, there is a striking confluence of indirect evidence 
that indicates that this bellicose tradition with its justification of 
Athenian aggression originated with Athenian-Theban antagonisms in the 
mid-fifth century. Since the topos seems peculiarly epitaphic in its 
tendenz, rough termini a quo and ad quem can be provisionally established: 
the invention of the epitaphios is variously but traditionally dated to 
the early 470's, while Herodotus' usage of the topos at 9.27 may point 
to its currency before 440.26 Now, in 460 Athens formed an alliance 
with Argos, and the Argives aided the Athenians in their adventurist 
campaigns in Boeotia in 458.̂  A thousand Argives fought alongside the 
Athenians at Tanagra (Thuc. 1.107.5), and those who died in battle, per­
haps as many as four hundred, were accorded the high honour of being 
buried in the Kerameikos (Paus. 1.29.8), presumably sharing in the 
encomium as well.28 Thus the Argive connection and Athenian incursions 
into Boeotia suggest the likelihood that the bellicose version of the 
Seven legend was developed around this time in the epitaphios to justify
Athenian aggression paradigmatically.29 This conclusion is further 
supported by circumstantial evidence in two ways. Euripides' Suppliants 
contained many funeral oration topoi and featured the warlike version 
of the myth in which Theseus defeated the Thebans in battle and forced 
them to return the bodies of the S e v e n . 30 i n  particular, it seems to 
refer to the Argive-Athenian alliance both in Adrastus' oath (1191-5), 
which embodies a treaty of επιμαχία, and in the legendary tripod on 
which the oath was inscribed (1196-1204). The language of these lines 
has been shown to be typical of fifth-century treaties, and a case has 
been made that the tripod on which it was inscribed, a mythical gift of 
Heracles, actually existed, a pia fraus in Zuntz's words, when the play 
was performed.
This counterfeit and the inscription on it, "hallowed by the impen­
etrable nimbus of sanctity and antiquity" at the time the play was per­
formed, could only have been devised in the 450's. 32 χη the Suppliants, 
then, termed εγκώμιον Αθηνών in its hypothesis and specifically linked 
to the Athenian funeral oration by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.17.4), 
Euripides grounded the epitaphic version of its myth in pseudo-legendary 
materials devised in the era in which this bellicose variant seems first
Ο Oto have been propagated. J Finally, by an intricate but highly spec­
ulative argument, L. H. J e f f e r y  has posited that the much debated subject 
of the "Battle of Oinoe" in the Stoa Poikile was in fact the combat be­
tween the Athenians and the Thebans over the burial of the S e v e n . 34 
The construction of the Stoa was finished by 460, and the paintings were 
installed in the years immediately t h e r e a f t e r .35 This conjecture, if 
correct, would point to the Argive alliance and Athenian intervention 
in Boeotia in the 450's as the impulse that gave rise to the warlike 
version of the myth whose function was to transform Athenian aggression 
into selfless benefaction and the repulse of unjust invasion. It should 
be emphasized that contrary versions of such a legend could exist side 
by side in the culture, just as discrepant historical accounts did. 
Isocrates provides an excellent example. In both the Panegyricus (55, 58) 
and the Plataicus (53) he followed the epitaphic version wherein the 
Athenians won a military victory to compel Thebes to relinquish the 
bodies of the Seven. But later in the Panathenaicus (168-174), the
story was given its peaceful resolution. Isocrates there acknowledged 
its variance with his earlier accounts, testily deflecting criticism 
over his change. Thus, such alterations were recognized as more than 
incidental. Isocrates' desire to promote a Theban alliance may have 
motivated this change.^  In other words, such variations were based on 
specific ideological rationales. It is likewise significant that 
Philochorus (FGrHist 328 112) followed a version differing from the 
epitaphic tradition. Indeed, Kleidemos (FGrHist 323 F. 18) did the same 
for the Amazonomachy. Far from expounding the patriotic line, these 
Atthidographers rejected versions of legends framed to fulfill the ideol­
ogy of the funeral orations, validation of Athenian aggression to 
mediate the conflict of φίλονοκία with Panhellenic altruism.37 What is 
more, similar contradictions and the same tendentious reworking of myth 
can be shown in two other legends, that of the Eumolpidae and the story 
of the battle of the Amazons.
Historically, before the seventh century B.C. Eleusis was an auton­
omous city, dominating the rich agricultural area to the west of Athens. 
It was then taken over by Athens and incorporated into Attica.38 The 
history of Eleusis' prior independence was preserved in a variety of 
legends. One of these featured the resistance of their king Eumolpus 
to Athenian encroachment, in which he called to his aid Thracian -­
that is, barbarian —  allies. In the epitaphic tradition Eumolpus and 
the Thracians were depicted as aggressors. Although the legend as trans­
mitted is very complicated, with a number of important variations, the 
only one of direct concern is the difference in the accounts of how the 
Athenians warded off E u m o l p u s .39 The funeral orations and related lit­
erature portrayed Eumolpus as an invader, whereas in historical terms 
it was the Athenians who had been the aggressors in their annexation of 
Eleusis. Further, he was connected with barbarian intruders; indeed in 
some accounts he was called a Thracian prince, although the Thracian 
relation most likely referred to the influence of the Dionysian religion, 
which had its roots in Thrace, upon the famous Eleusinian mysteries.40 
Finally, in the epitaphic versions the Athenians destroyed Eumolpus1 
army with military force. But Pausanias knew of a local account in 
which the conflict was settled by a truce that gave Athens political
rule over Eleusis but left control over the mystery religion with the 
Eleusinians (1.38.2; 2.14.2).
Further, in our sources the defeat of the Eumolpidae was often close­
ly related to, almost equated with, the invasion of the Amazons, another 
barbarian tribe. Although the Amazons were mentioned in literature as 
early as Homer (II. 3.189; 6.186), the legend of combat between the 
Athenians and Amazons alone dates to the early fifth century, not long 
after the development of the Attic funeral oration. The earliest liter­
ary notice is in Aeschylus' Eumenides (685 ff.), while vase paintings 
on this theme first occurred in the second or third quarters of the fifth 
century.41 In the funeral orations the Amazonomachy was Athens' defence 
of her native soil and, by larger implication, of all G r e e c e . y et in 
earlier versions the casus belli had been Theseus' rape of an Amazon 
queen as he accompanied Heracles on a raiding expedition, while the re­
pulse of the Amazons' counterattack featured both Heracles and Theseus. 
The surviving epitaphioi, however, made no mention of these motives, of 
Heracles, or even of Theseus. The hero and his amorous adventures fell 
from view; the Athenians alone resisted the imperial ambitions of the 
Amazons who were now allied with the barbarian Scyths. Yet there was an 
important local variant, preserved in the Atthis of Kleidemos, Plutarch 
reports (Thes. 27.3-4 = Kleidemos, FGrHist 323 F. 18):
Kleidemos, who wishes to be minute, writes that the left wing 
of the Amazons extended to what is now known as the Amazo- 
neion . . . .  Joining battle . . . the Athenians were driven 
back at the Peiraic gate as far as the shrine of the Eumen­
ides . . . .  After three months a treaty was made . . . .
By contrast, Lysias remarked in his funeral oration, after a lengthy 
description of the Amazons' aggressive designs:
But having met with valiant men they found their spirit was 
like to their sex . . . .  They would not return home and 
report their own misfortune and our ancestors' valour. For 
they perished on the spot and were punished for their folly, 
thus making our own citizens' memory imperishable for its
valour, while renderirg their own country nameless. (Lys.
2.4-6, abridged)
Thus, just as with the Seven or the Eumolpidae, the funeral oration pro­
pounded a special version of the legend in which the Athenians destroyed 
the invaders with military might. The suppression of peaceful solutions 
found in other traditions and the insistence on military victory were 
intrinsic to this mythological rhetoric. For these specialized legends 
were reshaped analogically by the Athenians' historical experience and 
by their perception of what those deeds signified within the cultural 
matrix. Thus, the myths, like the tendentious historical exempla, con­
formed to a conceptual grid, a mediating discourse, which was invented 
to make sense of the contradictions inherent in contemporary Greek cul­
ture and interstate political reality. Serving as paradigms, they 
anticipated or forecast the significance of historical deeds, as the 
Athenians saw it. In this way, the legends verified the terms of the 
epitaphic discourse and reinforced its message. Yet this discourse was 
not explicit, but covert, embodied, indeed submerged, in these mythical 
paradigms and historical exempla. Their real meaning can only be elic­
ited by understanding how they stood in opposition to other traditional 
or historical accounts. These differences the Athenians themselves were 
well aware of. If we are to discover the function of the epitaphioi 
and their encoded message, we must bring these discrepancies to the sur­
face and seat them in their historical and cultural context.
It has been a major thesis of this paper that a principal function 
of the epitaphioi logoi at Athens was to reconcile or mediate conflicting 
cultural codes. If that be so, what was there about the funeral oration 
that made it an appropriate vehicle for this purpose? It was pertinent 
first of all because it was a prominent part of a community ritual, the 
burial of the war dead, one that stemmed from Athens' relations with the 
other Greek states. The death of Athens' citizen soldiers in wars with 
her neighbours or foreign invaders engendered troubling contradictions 
which demanded resolution. In fact, the epitaphios logos was itself a 
ritual act. That ritualistic character is clear, for instance, from the 
formulaic, almost liturgical nature of the speeches. Explicit evidence
is provided by Socrates' revealing -- albeit ironic —  remarks in the 
Menexenus (235A-C) about the speeches' effect on the Athenian audience:
These orators bewitch our souls when they laud the city in 
every possible way, both those who have fallen in war, all 
our ancestors before us, and us ourselves who still live.
The result is that . . . I feel quite grand when I hear their 
praise, and every time I listen to them and come under their 
spell, I have an almost religious experience (έξέστηκα) and 
feel at that particular moment that I have become bigger, and 
better, and more noble . . . .  It is a feeling of awe and 
sublimity (σεμνότης) that stays with me at least two or three 
days. That speech and its tones ring so clearly in my ears 
that not until the fourth or fifth day —  and that with some 
difficulty —  do I come to myself and recognise that I do not 
dwell in the Isles of the Blessed.
Thus, the themes of the epitaphioi were self-reflexive, and to recite 
and to hear those speeches was a sort of sacrament or ritual whose func­
tion, in the words of Pierre Giraud, "[was] not so much to inform as to 
commune. Its aim [was] to illustrate the solidarity of individuals 
relative to social, religious, or national obligations contracted by the 
community."43 But the funeral oration was only one part of a much 
larger ceremony of bereavement and burial. That ceremony was composed 
of a number of verbal and physical acts, which, joined with the very 
environment of their performance, place, people, time, and human behav­
iour, constituted a total act of communication.44 Accordingly, the 
funeral of the dead would rhetorically reinforce and present, as a con­
crete symbol of Athens' self-proclaimed role of benefactor in the Greek 
world, both her boast of φιλονικία and primacy and the fearful reality 
of isolation and defeat. Thus, conversely, these war dead and the pro­
cedure of their interment became a physical analogue that verified the 
terms of the oration.
Furthermore, the funeral speeches shared with the locale of burial, 
the Kerameikos, and with the burial ceremony an important function as a 
boundary zone between the living and the dead, a sacred zone in which.
typically, the normal and the well-defined were replaced by the abnormal 
and the ambiguous. Indeed, for every culture such transition areas, 
whether geographic, social, biological, or of status, are deeply ambig­
uous, the focus of ritual, magic, or taboo, where cultural oppositions 
are both delimited and mediated.Commonly, these boundaries are marked 
by special rites de passage which are designed both to bridge and to 
define social zones considered normal, time-bound, and clear-cut; but 
they are themselves abnormal, timeless, and ambiguous.The epitaph­
ios, the centrepiece of public Athenian funerary rites, displays just 
such characteristics. Myth and history are mixed together to provide 
timeless exemplars of Athenian prowess and excellence. The clear-cut 
opposition between discrepant cultural ideals or between those ideals 
and reality are mediated in a realm of linguistic and semantic ambiguity. 
Finally, normal history or tradition is suspended and inverted; cus­
tomary legends are transmuted. In this special context, the apparent 
license of the orators in distorting myth and history becomes understand­
able: in the liminal zone which the funeral oration constituted the 
normal sequences and narratives of history and tradition could be trans­
gressed. On this view, it is no paradox that the Athenians were able 
to entertain inconsistent versions of their history and legends.^
To be sure, the treatment of the available evidence has been far 
from exhaustive in this paper, and only some of the many issues and 
exempla which the Attic funeral oration expounded have been examined.
What is more, the surviving evidence from antiquity constitutes only a 
small fraction of what once existed. In the classical era, Greece was 
embroiled in almost constant internecine warfare, and Athens was fre­
quently involved in these conflicts. Thus, the epitaphioi over the war 
dead must have been given almost annually in the Kerameikos. Yet out 
of these, we have only a half dozen speeches, some dependent texts, 
fragments, and reports. None the less, it is possible to reconstruct 
the message of this literature with some accuracy and confidence. The 
information contained in the encoded discourse which the funeral orations 
comprise has been preserved against error or loss by the great redundancy 
of the speeches. By compiling all the available data from antiquity, 
superimposing them, and summing them up, we can construct a composite
transmission of the cultural message which the funeral orations were 
• A Rsending. It was a message whose senders and receivers were one and 
the same, the Athenian demos; or, to paraphrase Lévi-Strauss, "the 
funeral orations were like conductors of an orchestra whose audience 
became the silent performers .
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sary of the battle of Marathon had apparently been moved to this day, 
about a month after the date of the actual event, because the day was 
sacred to Artemis Agrotera (Plut. MH 862) and Kallimachos, polemarch at 
Marathon, had vowed to sacrifice a yearling goat to her for every Persian 
slain (Xen. Anab. 3.2.12; Arist. ÎAP] 58.1; schol. Arist. Eg. 658. Ael., 
Var. Hist.., is apparently wrong in giving 6 Thargelion and three hundred 
kids). Indeed, on this same day occurred the mythical battle of the 
Athenians against the Eumolpidae: Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F. 13; 
Pherecydes, FGrHist 333 F. 2; Hesychius, s.v. Βοηδρομεΐν. Coincidentally, 
a number of other famous victories over the Persians can also be assigned 
to Boedromion: on the third or fourth, Plataea and Mykale; on the twen­
tieth, Salamis (Plut. Cam. 19.3). This striking confluence of data ex­
cites the suspicion that the anniversaries of the Amazonomachy and the 
defeat of the Eumolpidae were deliberately set on the sixth of Boedromion 
to connect them with the victory over the Persians. It should be noted 
that F. Jacoby ("Genesia: A Forgotten Festival of the Dead," CO 38 
[1944] 65-75) identified the Genesia, which occurred on 5 Boedromion, 
with the burial of the Athenian war dead and with the delivery of the 
epitaphios logos; this is rejected as too early by A.W. Gomme (at n. 2) 
100-1; L. Meridier, Platon (at n. 16) 52-3, gives 5-7 Pyanepsion without 
authority. Finally, the supposed bivouac of the Amazons at the base of 
the Areopagus (Plut. Thes. 27.3; D.S. 4.28.2; Ammonius, FGrHist 361 F. 4; 
Steph. Byz. s.v. ’Αμαζονεΐον; Bibl. Epig. 1.16; Aesch. Eum. 685-690) 
turns out to be the very place the Persians encamped when they occupied
Athens (Hdt. 8.52).
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